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CRIMINAL LAW– WHEN APPLES TASTE LIKE ORANGES, YOU CANNOT 
JUDGE A BOOK BY ITS COVER: HOW TO FIGHT EMERGING SYNTHETIC 
“DESIGNER” DRUGS OF ABUSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When one hears “synthetic drug,” it is likely that the term “cannibal-
ism” is not far behind.1 However, imagine after a friend promises you a brief 
high, you snort a powdery substance. Over the next four days, you cannot 
sleep and experience waves of terrifying delusions. On the fourth day, while 
you are standing at the kitchen sink with your father, you think you see 
twenty-five police cars outside your house, and out of fear, you grab a 
butcher knife and slit your own throat. Your father stops the bleeding and 
saves your life, but the next day paranoia paralyzes you to the point that you 
put a gun in your mouth and pull the trigger. Unfortunately for Richard 
Sanders, this is not hard to imagine because it is how his son, Dickie Sand-
ers, committed suicide.2 
The powdery substance that pushed Dickie Sanders to take his own life 
was marketed as “Cloud 9,”3 which is a synthetic designer drug that contin-
ues to be sold in the United States as “bath salts.”4 Synthetic drugs are not a 
new phenomenon.5 The term “designer drugs” was first introduced in 1984 
and was defined as “analogues, or chemical cousins, of controlled substanc-
es that are designed to produce effects similar to the controlled substances 
they mimic.”6 
 
 1. Zunny Losoya, Comment, Synthetic Drugs - Emergence, Legislation, and the Crimi-
nal and Legal Aftermath of Broad Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 401, 406 (2013) (noting that 
bath salts became popular in the media when a man, presumed to be under the influence of 
bath salts, viciously attacked a homeless man and began eating the homeless man’s face). 
 2. Jenny Marder, Bath Salts: The Drug That Never Lets Go, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 
20, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/multimedia/bath-salts/. 
 3. Bob Warren, Snorting Bath Salts Pushed St. Tammany Man to Suicide, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE (Jan. 16, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2011/01/snorting_
bath_salts_pushed_st.html. 
 4. Stevens v. Thomas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88992, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2011) 
(noting “Cloud 9 is a marketing name for methylenedioxypyrovalerone (‘MDPV’)”). 
 5. Jeffrey C. Grass, McFadden v. United States: Deconstructing Synthetic Drug Prose-
cutions, THE CHAMPION MAGAZINE (May 2015), https://d5l52uwo4grdg.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Grass_Deconstructing_Synthetic_Drugs_May_2015_Champion_
Article-1-1.pdf. 
 6. L.A. King & A. T. Kicman, A Brief History of ‘New Psychoactive Substances’, 
DRUG TESTING & ANALYSIS (Jul.-Aug. 2011), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/dta.
319/epdf. 
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The Controlled Substance Act of 1970 (CSA) defines a “controlled 
substance” as a “drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included 
in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of the schedules of controlled substances.”7 
Under the schedules of controlled substances, a schedule I drug is a drug, or 
other substance, that (1) has a high potential for abuse; (2) for which there is 
currently no accepted medical use for treatment in the United States; and (3) 
for which there is a lack of accepted safety, even under medical supervi-
sion.8 
The Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act (Analogue Act) 
states that a controlled substance analogue, such as a designer drug, shall be 
treated “for the purposes of [f]ederal law as a controlled substance in sched-
ule I.”9 Therefore, a designer drug can be illegal under federal law, notwith-
standing the fact that the designer drug is not listed in the CSA.10 Under the 
federal controlled substance schedules, with the exception as provided by 21 
U.S.C. 802(32)(C), the phrase “controlled substance analogue” is defined as: 
(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemi-
cal structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II; 
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the 
central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the 
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II; or 
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or 
intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the 
central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the 
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.
11
 
The purpose of the CSA is to ban the behavioral effects of drugs that 
have a potential for abuse.12 Therefore, the spirit of the CSA is not effective-
ly enforced when courts focus on a synthetic drug’s chemical structure to 
determine if the synthetic drug falls under the controlled substance analogue 
provision of the CSA. The intent of the CSA would be brought to fruition if 
a substance’s behavioral effects on an individual’s central nervous system 
were emphasized when determining if a synthetic drug is a controlled sub-
stance analogue. 
 
 7. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(6) (2012 & Supp. I 2017). 
 8. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012). 
 9. 21 U.S.C.A. § 813 (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 10. See id. 
 11. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 12. See United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 432 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Section II of this note will begin by introducing the foundation under-
lying drugs of abuse and the laws that have been enacted to regulate them. 
Section III of this note will highlight the problems created by street chemists 
outsmarting elected officials. Section IV will show how courts invoking the 
power of all the features defining a “substance” as a controlled substance 
analogue would solve the problems created by synthetic drugs of abuse. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Over the last several years, synthetic drug abuse in the United States 
has developed into a serious problem.13 One must gain a basic understanding 
behind the biology relating to drugs of abuse to fully understand how drug 
laws were drafted to deal with the problems these drugs have created. 
The pharmacological effects of certain drugs of abuse have been rec-
ognized since the beginning of recorded human history.14 A drug’s biologi-
cal effect on an individual’s central nervous system15 depends on the class of 
drug that has been put into the individual’s system. Different drug classes 
will have different effects on an individual’s central nervous system.16 
Emerging synthetic drugs of abuse work by mimicking the effects of the 
controlled substances they are designed to imitate.17 
A. The Biology Behind Drugs of Abuse 
Typically, the phrase “drug abuse” is used when an individual has tak-
en an illicit or licit drug in an excessive or non-medical manner.18 One of the 
primary factors of drug abuse is the expected euphoria that a drug user expe-
riences, which comes from the central nervous system effects of the drug 
 
 13. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2013 NATION DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 1 (Nov. 
2013), http://www.dea.gov/resource-center/DIR-017-13%20NDTA%20Summary%20final
.pdf. 
 14. Michael J. Brownstein, A Brief History of Opiates, Opioid Peptides, and Opioid 
Receptors, 90 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5391 (1993) (noting most modern pharmacologists 
believe the method of producing opium was described in Homer’s The Odyssey, as early as 
the Ninth Century B.C.). 
 15. Central Nervous System, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (abr. ed. 
1995) (defining “central nervous system” as “the part of the nervous system which in verte-
brates consists of the brain and spinal cord, to which sensory impulses are transmitted and 
from which motor impulses pass out, and which supervises and coordinates the activity of the 
entire nervous system”). 
 16. ERIC J, NESTLER ET AL., MOLECULAR NEUROPHARMACOLOGY: A FOUNDATION FOR 
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 364 (2009). 
 17. King &. Kicman, supra note 6. 
 18. ANTHONY J. TREVOR ET AL., KATZUNG & TREVOR’S PHARMACOLOGY EXAMINATION 
AND BOARD REVIEW 260 (11th ed. 2015). 
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that is being abused.19 The presence of the neurotransmitter dopamine20 in 
the mesolimbic system21 has been linked as a principal component in the 
expression of “reward.”22 However, most addictive drugs lead to excessive 
dopaminergic stimulation in such a way that the rewarded behavior, i.e., 
taking the drug, becomes a physical compulsion.23 Although dopamine is not 
the only neurochemical characteristic of drugs of abuse, it has been recog-
nized that most addictive drugs display effects that include actions that ex-
acerbate the dopaminergic effects on the drug user’s central nervous sys-
tem.24 
An expert pharmacologist, Dr. William Fantegrossi,25 noted that 
“[p]harmacology is based on the theory that drugs exert their actions as a 
consequence of binding to specific protein targets.”26 When a drug of abuse 
binds to its specific binding site, which is located within the central nervous 
system, there is a change in brain function, which leads to changes in cogni-
tion, emotion, and behavior.27 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Dopamine, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (abr. ed. 1995) (defining 
“dopamine” as “a monoamine C8H11NO2 that is a decarboxylated form of dopa and occurs 
especially as a neurotransmitter in the brain and as an intermediate in the biosynthesis of 
epinephrine”). 
 21. Dreyer JL, New Insights into the Roles of MicroRNAs in Drug Addiction and Neuro-
plasticity, GENOME MED. (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.genomemedicine.com/content/pdf
/gm213.pdf (“Drugs of abuse modulate gene expression, and produce their rewarding effects 
of euphoria or pleasure through an interaction with the mesolimbic dopaminergic system, 
leading to persistent alterations (neuroplastic, structural and functional) in the reward-related 
and memory-related brain centers.”). 
 22. TREVOR ET AL., supra note 18. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Fantegrossi Aff. 1 (Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with author) (noting Dr. William Fan-
tegrossi is a tenured Associate Professor in the Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology 
at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, who is a member of the Arkansas Center 
for Drug Detection and Response, has comprehensive knowledge of synthetic drugs of abuse, 
whose pharmacological research has helped form the scientific basis for Arkansas formally 
scheduling a wide range of synthetic drugs, and who regularly acts as an expert witness in 
litigation concerning emerging synthetic drugs of abuse); E-mail from Dr. William Fan-
tegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology at the University of Arkansas for 
Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on file with author) (“I am not a 
lawyer and don’t claim to know a lot about how the law works on this stuff, but as a pharma-
cologist I can give you my personal opinion on the matter.”). 
 26. E-mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology 
at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on 
file with author). 
 27. Id. 
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Dr. Fantegrossi states that evaluating a substance’s affinity,28 efficacy,29 
and potency can assess drugs of abuse.30 Affinity and efficacy can be deter-
mined using in vitro31 assays.32 While potency33 is determined by using ani-
mal models of drug addition by conducting in vivo34 assays, a trained phar-
macologist can evaluate the pharmacological effects of a synthetic drug, as 
compared to a drug scheduled under the CSA, by using in vitro assays to 
determine if a synthetic drug binds to and activates the same receptor as a 
drug scheduled under the CSA, and by using in vivo assays to determine if a 
synthetic drug elicits similar behavioral effects as a drug scheduled under 
the CSA.35 
Since a drug’s chemical structure, the drug’s three-dimensional 
“shape,” determines its ability to bind to the drug’s binding site, it would 
make some sense to initially evaluate a drug based solely on its chemical 
structure.36 Drugs that have the same chemical structure may be expected to 
bind to identical binding sites, and thus induce identical behavioral effects.37 
However, Dr. Fantegrossi noted that this idea “ignores the fact that simply 
binding to a drug target is not sufficient to determine pharmacological ef-
fects.”38 Due to the fact that small changes in chemical structure can lead to 
significant changes in pharmacological activity, Dr. Fantegrossi believes “it 
 
 28. Fantegrossi Aff. 2 (Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with author) (defining “Affinity” as, “[t]he 
ability of a drug to bind to a specific receptor,” and noting drugs with a higher affinity will 
bind to a receptor better than drugs with a lower affinity). 
 29. Id.at 3 (defining “Efficacy” as, “[t]he capacity of a drug to activate a receptor to 
produce a cellular response”). 
 30. Id. at 5–8. 
 31. In Vitro, A DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY (5th ed. 2004) (defining “in vitro” as 
“[d]escribing biological processes that are made to occur outside the living body, in laborato-
ry apparatus (literally ‘in glass’, i.e. in a test tube)”). 
 32. Assay, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (abr. ed. 1995) (defining “as-
say” as “examination and determination as to charateristics (as weight, measure, or quality)”). 
 33. Id. (defining “potency” as the dose required to elicit some threshold response, and 
noting “[p]otent drugs will induce biological effects with low doses, while drugs that are less 
potent will require higher doses to produce the same effect”). 
 34. In Vivo, A DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY (5th ed. 2004) (defining “in vivo” as 
“[d]escribing biological processes as they are observed to occur in their natural environment, 
i.e. within living organisms”). 
 35. Fantegrossi Aff. 3 (Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with author); E-mail from Dr. William 
Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology at the University of Arkansas for 
Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on file with author). 
 36. E-mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology 
at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on 
file with author). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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is imperative to actually perform in vitro (test tube) and in vivo (animal) 
studies to accurately determine pharmacological effects.”39 
Because people abuse drugs for the drug’s biological effects and a 
drug’s biological effects come from the interaction between the drug and its 
binding site, knowing a drug’s pharmacological properties is more benefi-
cial than knowing a drug’s chemical structure.40 Since knowing a drug’s 
pharmacological properties gives a better understanding of the drug’s behav-
ioral effects, Dr. Fantegrossi believes “laws aimed at regulating drugs in 
order to decrease their abuse should be based on pharmacological data,” and 
not the drug’s chemical structure.41 
B. The Federal Laws Governing Drugs of Abuse 
There are federal and state laws that control drugs and emerging syn-
thetic designer drugs.42 Federal drug laws are controlled by the CSA, and the 
ambiguity of the statutory language of the CSA is favorable to criminal de-
fendants. 
1. The Controlled Substance Act of 1970 
The nearly epidemic problem of drug abuse in the 1960s led to the en-
actment of the CSA.43 The CSA’s principal purpose was “designed to deal in 
a comprehensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the 
United States,” by providing “authority for increased efforts in drug abuse 
prevention and rehabilitation of users,” “more effective means for law en-
forcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and control,” and “an overall 
balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs.”44 
The CSA made it unlawful to knowingly manufacture, distribute, or 
possess with the intent to distribute controlled substances.45 The knowledge 
requirement of the CSA can be satisfied in two ways.46 First, the defendant 
having knowledge that he or she possessed any controlled substance, even if 
 
 39. Id. (“This is particularly true with novel drugs of abuse, like the current crop of new 
synthetics available from online sellers. In many cases, the structures of these drugs are simi-
lar to traditional drugs of abuse, but in other cases we have no “standard” whatsoever against 
which to compare.”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See 21 U.S.C. § 802. et seq. (2012 & Supp. I. 2017 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-215 
(Repl. 2016). 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 598 (1970). 
 44. Id. at 593. 
 45. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017); see also McFadden v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2302 (2015). 
 46. McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2304. 
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the defendant did not know the identity of the substance, will satisfy the 
knowledge requirement.47 Second, the defendant knowing the identity of the 
substance, even if the defendant did not know the substance constitutes a 
controlled substance, will satisfy the knowledge requirement.48 
2. The Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986 
The Analogue Act49 identifies a category of substances “substantially 
similar” to the chemical substances listed on the federal controlled substance 
schedules50 and then instructs courts to treat substantially similar analogues 
as controlled substances listed under schedule I for purposes of federal 
law.51 Then New York Senator, Alfonse Marcello D’Amato, said the Ana-
logue Act “close[d] the loophole in present law that allows the creation and 
distribution of deadly new drugs without violating [f]ederal law.”52 
Before the Analogue Act, the CSA was constrained to the exact chemi-
cal description of the substances that were listed under the CSA.53 The prob-
lem with enforcing the CSA as it was written before the Analogue Act was 
passed was that anyone who knew basic chemistry would have the ability to 
modify the chemical structure of a controlled substance and make a sub-
stance with a slightly altered chemical structure that was legal to manufac-
ture and distribute under the CSA.54 This enforcement problem was exacer-
bated due to the fact that the statutory language of the CSA focused so much 
on the chemical structure of a compound that it provided a lucrative motive 
for profiteers to experiment with the chemical structures of the substances 
listed under the CSA.55 
The Analogue Act aimed to stop street chemists from slightly altering 
the chemical structure of a controlled substance to create a new drug not 
scheduled under the CSA, which allowed the new drug to maintain the same 
desired behavioral effects of the controlled substance and elude prosecution 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Gerald F. Uelmen & Alex Kreit, The Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement 
Act of 1986, 1 DRUG ABUSE & THE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 3:157 (Dec. 2015) (S. 1437 was 
enacted as the “Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986,” Pub. L. No. 99-
570, §§ 1201 to 1204, signed by President Reagan on October 27, 1986). 
 50. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017); McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2305. 
 51. McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 52. United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Senator Al 
D’Amato’s statement in 131 Cong. Rec. 27311 (1985)). 
 53. U.S. DEP’T JUST., HANDBOOK ON THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 52 (Mar. 
1987), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/157817NCJRS.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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under the CSA.56 However, the Analogue Act did not alter the CSA’s 
knowledge requirement, which states the Government must prove that the 
defendant “knowingly manufactur[ed], distribut[ed], or possess[ed] with 
intent to distribute ‘a controlled substance.’”57 
Similar to the CSA, the knowledge requirement of the Analogue Act 
can be established in two ways.58 The first is by showing that the defendant 
knew the chemical in his or her possession was a controlled substance under 
federal law, regardless of whether the defendant had actual knowledge of 
the chemical’s specific identity.59 The second is by showing that the defend-
ant had knowledge of the specific analogue in his or her possession, regard-
less if the defendant knew the legal status of the analogue in his or her pos-
session.60 The knowledge requirement of the Analogue Act cannot be over-
come by a defendant showing a lack of knowledge of the Analogue Act, as 
long as there is evidence to show that the defendant had knowledge that he 
or she possessed a controlled substance.61 
3. The Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 
On July 9, 2012, the Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 
(SDAPA) amended the CSA62 to include “cannabimimetic agents”63 as 
Schedule I controlled substances.64 The SDAPA came with mixed reviews 
regarding how effective the newly enacted legislation would be on the 
emerging synthetic drug problem.65 James Burns, a special agent with the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in upstate New York, stated that 
the SDAPA should help with the fight against synthetic drugs.66 However, 
Anthony Tambasco, a forensic scientist in Mansfield, Ohio, was not as op-
timistic that the SDAPA would be effective, stating “[it will] help in some 
regards, that these things need to be listed and controlled,” “[b]ut you’ll 
 
 56. Hodge, 321 F.3d at 433–34; United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 238 (D. Col. 
1992). 
 57. McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2305 (2015). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 21 U.S.C.A. § 811 (2012 & Supp. I. 2017); 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 63. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 64. United States v. Ways, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56413, at *9 (D. Neb. Apr. 23, 2014). 
 65. See Joel Rose, Fake Pot is a Real Problem for Regulators, NAT. PUB. RADIO (July 
12, 2012, 3:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/12/156615024/fake-pot-is-a-real-problem-
for-regulators (“If we can make the bad guys react to what we’re doing instead of us reacting 
to what the bad guys are doing, then I think that’ll help us get a better handle on this issue.”). 
 66. Id. 
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have, again, new compounds coming through the door that we’ll have to 
deal with.”67 
III. THE PROBLEM: STREET CHEMISTS ARE OUTSMARTING THE 
LEGISLATURE 
The DEA has recognized enforcement challenges related to synthetic 
drugs, which pose an undeniable risk to public health and safety.68 The rap-
idly emerging threat of synthetic drugs is one the federal government knows 
all too well.69 While the issues surrounding synthetic drugs are not new, 
Congress has recently demonstrated a rehabilitated concern surrounding 
synthetic drugs.70 
A. Legislation Cannot Keep Up with Street Chemists 
The DEA noted the ease with which the chemical structure of a sub-
stance can be manipulated to produce a new substance not structurally simi-
lar to that of a controlled substance, while allowing the new substance to 
retain similar pharmacological effects of the original chemical substance.71 
Problematically, street chemists may complete these manipulations repeti-
tively to stay ahead of new research and laws aimed at stopping newly 
emerging chemical substances.72 
The DEA has raised several prosecutorial challenges that law enforce-
ment agencies face when applying the Analogue Act, which include: (1) the 
individualistic nature of every case in determining whether the substance in 
question is considered an analogue under the specific facts of each case; (2) 
the extensive expert testimony needed to show that the substance in question 
is truly an analogue; (3) the subjective nature of the words “substantially 
similar” may differ between experts; (4) the research done to establish 
whether a substance is an analogue in one case cannot be used in a future 
case.73 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Synthetic Drugs (a.k.a. K2, Spice, Bath Salts, etc.), OFFICE OF NAT’ DRUG CONTROL 
POLICY, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/ondcp-fact-sheets/synthetic-drugs-k2-
spice-bath-salts (last visited Jun. 16, 2017). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Lisa N. Sacco & Kristin Finklea, Synthetic Drugs: Overview and Issues for 
Congress, CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42066.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 16. 
 72. Id. at 1 (“Designer drugs are a form of synthetic drugs. They slightly modify the 
molecular structures of illegal or controlled substances to circumvent existing drug laws.”). 
 73. Id. at 16. 
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B. The Issue of Statutory Interpretation 
The text of the analogue provision of the CSA is “not a model of clari-
ty.”74 The goal of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent and pur-
pose of Congress.75 If it is determined that the language of a statute is am-
biguous, a court should look to the statute’s legislative history to try and 
understand the statute’s original purpose.76 The statutory interpretation of 
the SDAPA has led to the SDAPA being enforced in direct opposition to the 
stated purpose of the CSA. The focal point of the controversy surrounds the 
absence of a coordinating conjunction and the judiciary using minute gram-
matical theory to determine what the judiciary believes the text of the statute 
should mean.77 
The root of all this controversy stems from 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A), 
which states: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term “controlled substance 
analogue” means a substance— 
(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to 
the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I 
or II; 
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to 
or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic ef-
fect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in 
schedule I or II; or 
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person 
represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallu-
cinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substan-
tially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a con-




 74. United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Common sense and 
the practical implications of various interpretive options ultimately offer more guidance than 
the text and structure of § 802(32)(A) itself. As a matter of strict textual analysis, § 
802(32)(A) is susceptible to either a disjunctive or a conjunctive reading.”). 
 75. United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 234 (D. Col. 1992). 
 76. United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is particularly im-
portant to confine ambiguous criminal statutes to their intended scope.”); see also Dowling v. 
United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213 (1985). 
 77. Hodge, 321 F.3d at 436–37. 
 78. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
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The imaginary coordinating conjunction at issue comes after the semi-
colon ending § 802(32)(A)(i) and before § 802(32)(A)(ii). 
This issue of statutory interpretation of § 802(32)(A) was considered in 
depth for the first time in Hodge,79 where the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit was charged with determining the meaning of a “con-
trolled substance analogue” under § 802(32)(A).80 The Hodge court began 
by correctly stating that a controlled substance analogue is substantially sim-
ilar to a controlled substance but is otherwise not prohibited under other 
federal drug laws.81 The Hodge court continued to correctly state that the 
purpose of the Analogue Act “is to prevent underground chemists from pro-
ducing slightly modified drugs that are legal but have the same effects and 
dangers as scheduled controlled substances.”82 
In Hodge, the government argued for an interpretation of the Analogue 
Act which read that a substance would be considered a controlled substance 
analogue if it satisfies any one of the clauses under § 802(32)(A), hence a 
disjunctive interpretation of § 802(32)(A).83 The appellants argued that a 
controlled substance analogue must satisfy both clause § 802(32)(A)(i) and 
either clause § 802(32)(A)(ii) or § 802(32)(A)(iii), hence a conjunctive in-
terpretation of § 802(32)(A).84 
The Hodge court began by reviewing the plain meaning of the statute.85 
Looking at the context of the Analogue Act, the court determined the con-
junctive reading of the CSA was more natural.86 This conclusion was formed 
by relying on the “doctrine of the last antecedent” that states “qualifying 
words, phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases imme-
diately preceding” and not to “others more remote.”87 Therefore, the court 
decided that the presence or absence of a conjunction is not necessary in 
determining if a statute is to be read conjunctively or disjunctively, rather 
 
 79. Hodge, 321 F.3d at 433 (“This is a matter of first impression in our Court. Moreover, 
no federal court of appeals has considered the issue in any depth.”; see McKinney v. United 
States, 221 F.3d 1343 (Table) (8th Cir. 2000) (paraphrasing the test in the conjunctive with-
out discussion); United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating the 
test in the disjunctive without discussion); see also United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 
1338 (11th Cir. 2002) (expressly declining to decide the issue). 
 80. Hodge, 321 F.3d at 431. 
 81. Id. at 432. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 433. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 436; see also Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 907, 909 (3d Cir. 
1990); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 86. Hodge, 321 F.3d at 436. 
 87. Id. 
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the court determined the provisions of the statute must be read in the context 
of one another.88 
The Hodge court noted that the plain meaning of § 802(32)(A) was 
ambiguous and that a disjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A) was plausible.89 
However, the court ultimately held that legislative history “indisputably” 
preferred a conjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A).90 After ruling for a defend-
ant-friendly reading of § 802(32)(A), the court noted that “[w]hen choice 
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a 
crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require 
that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.”91 
The issue of the statutory interpretation of § 802(32)(A) was reex-
amined in Turcotte, when a defendant challenged the statutory interpretation 
of § 802(32)(A).92 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit recognized that the specific constructional issue related to the reading of 
§ 802(32)(A) was an issue of first impression for the court.93 Similar to 
Hodge, the Turcotte court noted that there are two possible readings of § 
802(32)(A), and the issue at hand was determining the relevance of the sin-
gle word “or” between clauses § 802(32)(A)(ii) and § 802(32)(A)(iii).94 
In assessing the possible implications of the statutory interpretation of 
§ 802(32)(A), the court compared the disjunctive and conjunctive readings 
of the statute.95 The court determined that a disjunctive reading would lead 
to a substance being a controlled substance analogue if it met any of the 
three criteria of a controlled substance analogue.96 The court also determined 
that for a chemical to be a controlled substance under a conjunctive reading 
of § 802(32)(A) would require that the chemical in question to meet both § 
802(32)(A)(i) and either § 802(32)(A)(ii) or § 802(32)(A)(iii).97 
The Turcotte court noted a lack of clarity in the language of § 
802(32)(A) and emphasized that, as a matter of strict textual analysis, § 
 
 88. Id. (quoting United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 815 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“Whether requirements in a statute are to be treated as disjunctive or conjunctive does not 
always turn on whether the word ‘or’ is used; rather it turns on context.”). 
 89. Hodge, 321 F.3d at 436–37. 
 90. Id. at 436 (“The word ‘or’ between clauses (ii) and (iii) does not prove that all three 
clauses of § 802(32)(A) are disjunctive, only that many people would read it that way. With 
two possible readings, we conclude that § 802(32)(A) is ambiguous as to whether it should be 
read conjunctively or disjunctively.”). 
 91. Id. at 438, (quoting Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 214 (1985)). 
 92. See United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (noting “[t]here are two possible readings of this definition,” and “[a]s the old 
adage instructs, the devil is in the details—the relevant detail here being the single word “or” 
between clauses (ii) and (iii)” of § 802(32)(A).). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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802(32)(A) could be read disjunctively or conjunctively.98 However, similar 
to Hodge, the Turcotte court ultimately held that the district court’s jury 
instructions, which gave a disjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A), were errone-
ous, and the court gave notice to all the courts within its jurisdiction that a 
conjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A) should be applied in the future.99 
C. Focus on the Psychoactive Effects on the Central Nervous System 
The psychoactive100 effect of a drug refers to an action on the central 
nervous system of the individual who has taken the chemical substance and 
the subsequent alterations to the individual’s behavioral and cognitive abili-
ties.101 The pharmacological effect of the chemical substance producing the 
psychoactive effect on an individual’s central nervous system determines the 
substance’s abuse potential.102 Pharmacologists employ behavioral testing to 
help understand the mechanisms behind the psychoactive effects of chemi-
cal substances that have a potential for abuse.103 
1. How Courts Determine Whether a Substance is a Controlled Sub-
stance Analogue 
Drugs bind to particular receptors, and most receptors are regulatory 
proteins, which are normally embedded within the plasma membrane of a 
cell that receive and transmit chemical signals from outside the cell.104 
Pharmacologists classify drugs depending on how the chemical substance 
 
 98. Turcotte, 405 F.3d at 522. 
 99. Id. at 524. 
 100. Psychoactive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (abr. ed. 1995) (defining 
“Psychoactive” as “affecting the mind or behavior”). 
 101. JERRY J. BUCCAFUSCO, METHODS OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS IN NEUROSCIENCE 39 (2nd 
ed. 2008) (“The psychoactive effect of a drug usually refers to a chemical agent that exerts an 
action upon the central nervous system (CNS), alters brain function, and, consequently, pro-
duces a temporary change in an individual’s mood, feelings, perception, and/or behavior.”). 
 102. See Andrew P. Norwood et al., Predisposing Effects of Neonatal Visceral Pain on 
Abuse-Related Effects of Morphine in Adult Male Sprague Dawley Rats, 
231 Psychopharmacology 4281, *1–2 (2014) (Co-authored by Dr. William Fantegrossi); See 
also Martilias S. Farrell et al., In Vitro and In Vivo Characterization of the Alkaloid Nu-
ciferine, 11 Pub. Libr. Sci. One e0150602, *1–2 (2016) (Co-authored by Dr. Andrew P. Nor-
wood & Dr. William Fantegrossi); Andrew P. Norwood, Effects of Neonatal Visceral Pain on 
the Abuse-Related Effects of Morphine in Rats 13-15 (Dec. 17, 2013) (published Ph.D. disser-
tation, The University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences) (PROQUEST/UMI Publication No. 
3621700). 
 103. JERRY J. BUCCAFUSCO, METHODS OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS IN NEUROSCIENCE 179 (2nd 
ed. 2008) (A chapter co-authored by Dr. William Fantegrossi). 
 104. ANTHONY J. TREVOR ET AL., KATZUNG & TREVOR’S PHARMACOLOGY EXAMINATION 
AND BOARD REVIEW 2 (11th ed. 2015). 
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interacts with the binding site once the drug is bound to its target.105 When a 
drug binds to its particular receptor, four potential mechanisms of action 
include: (1) agonist; (2) antagonist; (3) allosteric activator; and (4) allosteric 
inhibitor.106 
However, just because two chemicals have similar chemical structures, 
it does not mean that the chemicals will have similar behavioral effects.107 
This principal can be understood by comparing the chemical structures of 
three different chemicals: (1) a classic drug of abuse, such as heroin,108 a 
Schedule I drug under § 812; (2) a synthetic antagonist, such as naltrex-
one,109 which has been recognized as a potential therapeutic treatment of 
heroin addiction;110 and (3) a synthetic drug of abuse, such as methadone,111 
a Schedule II drug under § 812. 
 
 105. E-mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology 
at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on 
file with author). 
 106. ANTHONY J. TREVOR ET AL., KATZUNG & TREVOR’S PHARMACOLOGY EXAMINATION 
AND BOARD REVIEW 3 (11th ed. 2015) (“A traditional agonist binds to the receptor and results 
in an activation of the receptor. A competitive inhibitor is a pharmacologic antagonist that 
completes with the agonist to bind to the receptor. An allosteric activator does not compete 
with the drug to bind at the same spot on the receptor, but once the allosteric activator and 
drug are both bound to the receptor the resulting physiological response is greater than the 
physiological response generated by just the drug alone. An allosteric inhibitor does not 
compete with the drug to bind at the same spot on the receptor, but once the allosteric inhibi-
tor and drug are both bound to the receptor the resulting physiological response is less than 
the physiological response generated by just the drug alone.”). 
 107. See A-L Wang et al., Neural Correlates of Adherence to Extended-Release Naltrex-
one Pharmacotherapy in Heroin Dependence, 5 TRANSLATIONAL PSYCHIATRY 3, *1 (2015); 
E-mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology at the 
University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on file 
with author). 
 108. Heroin, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (abr. ed. 1995) (defining 
“heroin” as “a strongly physiologically addictive narcotic C21H23NO5 that is made by 
acetylation of but is more potent than morphine and that is prohibited for medical use in the 
U.S. but is used illicitly for its euphoric effects”); E-mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, 
Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology at the University of Arkansas for Medical 
Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on file with author); See infra Table 1 (Chem-
ical A). 
 109. Naltrexone, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (abr. ed. 1995) (defining 
“naltrexone” as “a synthetic opiate antagonist C20H23NO4 used esp. to maintain detoxified 
opiate addicts in a drug-free state”); See infra Table 1 (Chemical B). 
 110. See 42 U.S.C. § 17554 (2012). 
 111. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); Methadone, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY (abr. ed. 1995) (defining “methadone” as “a synthetic addictive narcot-
ic drug C21H27NO used esp. in the form of its hydrochloride for the relief of pain and as a 
substitute narcotic in the treatment of heroin addiction”); See infra Table 1 (Chemical C). 
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Heroin and naltrexone share a substantially similar chemical structure 
because they both are synthesized from morphine,112 while methadone does 
not share a chemical similarity to either heroin or naltrexone because it is 
easily “synthesized from scratch.”113 Notably, even though methadone does 
not share a similar chemical structure with heroin or naltrexone, all three of 




 112. Heroin Manufacture, RHODIUM (Aug. 2004), https://www.erowid.org/archive/
rhodium/chemistry/heroinmfg.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2016); Preparation of naltrexone 
from codeine and 3-benzylmorphine, U.S. Patent No. US6013796 A (filed Jul. 16, 1998) 
(issued Jan. 11, 2000); E-mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology 
& Toxicology at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 
10:19 CST) (on file with author) (noting heroin and naltrexone have “very different pharma-
cological profiles” despite “having very similar chemical structures”). 
 113. Synthesis of Methadone, RHODIUM (Aug. 2004), https://www.erowid.org/archive/
rhodium/chemistry/methadone.html. 
 114. See Ahmad Altarifi et al., Effects of μ-Opioid Receptor Agonists in Assays of Acute 
Pain-Stimulated and Pain-Depressed Behavior in Male Rats: Role of μ-Agonist Efficacy and 
Noxious Stimulus Intensity, 352 J. PHARMACOLOGY EXPERIMENTAL THERAPUTICS 208 (Feb. 
2015) (noting morphine is a µ-opioid receptor agonist); CANADIAN AGENCY FOR DRUGS & 
TECHNOLOGIES IN HEALTH, SUBOXONE VERSUS METHADONE FOR THE TREATMENT OF OPIOID 
DEPENDENCE: A REVIEW OF THE CLINICAL AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS 1 (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK195153/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK195153.pdf (noting 
naltrexone is a µ-opioid receptor antagonist and methadone is a µ-opioid receptor agonist); E-
mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology at the 
University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on file 
with author) (noting heroin is a full agonist that activates the µ-opioid receptor to its fullest 
potential, while naltrexone is an antagonist that also binds to the µ-opioid receptor that does 
not activate the receptor and instead naltrexone blocks any other chemicals from binding to 
the µ-opioid receptor the naltrexone is bound to at that time). 
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a. Hypothetical 
For the purpose of this hypothetical, imagine methadone, a synthetic 
drug, has not yet been scheduled under § 812. If an individual were arrested 
with methadone in his or her possession, the judiciary would be charged 
with determining whether methadone would qualify as a “controlled sub-
stance analogue” under § 813. 
Applying the language of § 813, a controlled substance analogue is 
treated “for the purposes of any [f]ederal law as a controlled substance in 
schedule I.”115 This language requires the judiciary to look at § 802(32)(A) 
to determine if the substance represents a controlled substance analogue.116 
i. The substantially similar chemical structure provision 
of 21 U.S.C.     § 802(32)(A)(i) 
The first section of § 802(32)(A) requires a controlled substance ana-
logue to be a substance, “the chemical structure of which is substantially 
similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or 
II.”117 A visual inspection of the chemical structures of these drugs in Table 
1 illustrates that by using common sense, heroin and naltrexone “look” sub-
stantially similar, but methadone does not appear to “look” substantially 
similar to either heroin or naltrexone. Therefore, if courts were analyzing 
methadone, a prosecutor would not be able to prove the first section of 
§ 802(32)(A). 
ii. The substantially similar pharmacological effects provi-
sion of 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)(ii) 
The second section of § 802(32)(A) requires a controlled substance an-
alogue to be a substance “which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucino-
genic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or 
greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.”118 A review of 
the scientific literature shows that heroin has a potential for abuse and is 
associated with the development of addiction,119 while naltrexone does not 
have any abuse potential and has actually been noted as a possible remedy to 
 
 115. 21 U.S.C.A. § 813 (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 116. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 117. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A)(i) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 118. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A)(ii) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 119. See Amie Shei et al., Estimating the Health Care Burden of Prescription Opioid 
Abuse in Five European Countries, 7 CLINICOECONOMICS OUTCOMES RES. 477 (Sept. 5, 
2015). 
2017] CRIMINAL LAW 339 
heroin addiction.120 Like naltrexone, methadone has been associated as a 
potential treatment for opiate addiction.121 Unlike naltrexone, methadone 
itself has been associated with a potential for abuse and has been linked to 
an increase in deaths related to its misuse and abuse.122 Hence, methadone 
has “effect[s] on the central nervous system that [are] substantially simi-
lar”123 to heroin, whereas, naltrexone does not have any potential for abuse. 
Therefore, if courts were analyzing methadone, a prosecutor would be able 
to prove the second section of § 802(32)(A). 
iii. The presentation of substantially similar pharmacologi-
cal effects provision of 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)(iii) 
The third section of § 802(32)(A) requires a controlled substance ana-
logue to be a substance that “with respect to a particular person, [ ] such 
person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucino-
genic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater 
than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nerv-
ous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.”124 The Supreme 
Court of the United States has held that a defendant’s knowledge that a sub-
stance in his or her possession is controlled under federal law is enough to 
meet the knowledge requirement, even if the defendant did not know the 
substance’s actual identity.125 Although outside the scope of this Note, for 
the purposes of this hypothetical, a prosecutor would be able to prove both 
methadone and naltrexone meet the third section of § 802(32)(A). 
If methadone had not been scheduled and the judiciary were charged 
with determining whether methadone would qualify as a controlled sub-
stance analogue, a prosecutor could establish that methadone meets section 
§ 802(32)(A)(ii) and § 802(32)(A)(iii). In the same analysis, a prosecutor 
 
 120. Keith Ahamad et al., Factors Associated with Willingness to Take Extended Release 
Naltrexone Among Injection Drug Users, 10 ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRACTICE 12, 13 
(2015); E-mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology 
at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on 
file with author) (noting “naltrexone can actually reverse the respiratory arrest induced by 
heroin, and is regularly put to this use by first responder medical professionals in the case of 
opioid overdose”). 
 121. See Keith Ahamad et al., Factors Associated with Willingness to Take Extended 
Release Naltrexone Among Injection Drug Users, 10 ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRACTICE 
12 (2015). 
 122. Dave Marteau et al., The Relative Risk of Fatal Poisoning by Methadone or Bupren-
orphine Within the Wider Population of England and Wales, 5 BRITISH MED. J. 1, 2 (2015). 
 123. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A)(ii) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 124. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A)(iii) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 125. McFadden v. U.S., 135 S.Ct. 2298, 2302 (2015). 
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could establish that naltrexone meets section § 802(32)(A)(i) and § 
802(32)(A)(iii). 
b. Applying a conjunctive reading of 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A) to 
the hypothetical 
Using the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 
conjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A), for a substance to be a controlled sub-
stance analogue, the substance must meet both § 802(32)(A)(i) and § 
802(32)(A)(ii) or § 802(32)(A)(iii).126 Therefore, if the judiciary were faced 
with determining if methadone were a controlled substance analogue of her-
oin, a conjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A) would find methadone is not a 
controlled substance analogue, and the individual would have all criminal 
charges dismissed. 
This hypothetical holding would be in direct opposition to the purpose 
of the CSA.127 The government, through the National Institute of Drug 
Abuse (NIDA),128 has recognized an increase in the dangers related to the 
misuse and abuse of methadone.129 NIDA has also recognized that it must 
intensify its efforts to counter the growing misuse and abuse of metha-
done.130 
Interestingly, using the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit’s conjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A), naltrexone is “substantially 
similar to the chemical structure”131 to heroin, and if the knowledge re-
quirement were met, then naltrexone would be considered a controlled sub-
stance analogue.132 This finding would also be in direct opposition to the 
stated purpose of the CSA,133 because naltrexone does not have any abuse 
 
 126. U.S. v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 521–523 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 127. United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364, 366–67 (W.D. Pa. 1971). 
 128. Frequently Asked Questions: What does the National Institute on Drug Abuse 
(NIDA) do?, NAT’L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/frequently-asked-
questions#national (last updated Aug. 2015 (“NIDA is a Federal scientific research institute 
under the National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
NIDA is the largest supporter of the world’s research on drug abuse and addiction. NIDA-
funded scientific research addresses the most fundamental and essential questions about drug 
abuse, including tracking emerging drug use trends, understanding how drugs work in the 
brain and body, developing and testing new drug treatment and prevention approaches, and 
disseminating findings to the general public and special populations.”). 
 129. Nora D. Volkow, Methadone - Appropriate Use Provides Valuable Treatment for 
Pain and Addiction, NAT’L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE (Aug. 2008), https://www.drugabuse.gov
/about-nida/directors-page/messages-director/2008/08/methadone-appropriate-use-provides-
valuable-treatment-pain-addiction. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A)(i) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 132. U.S. v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 521–523 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 133. United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364, 366–67 (W.D. Pa. 1971). 
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potential134 and has been recognized as a potential therapeutic treatment of 
heroin addiction.135 
Essentially, the judiciary would get so wrapped up in minute grammat-
ical theory, rather than the statute’s clearly stated purpose of preventing the 
abuse of drugs,136 that it would find that methadone, which has been linked 
to “misuse or abuse,”137 not to be a controlled substance analogue, while 
under the same analysis finding naltrexone, which has no abuse potential,138 
to be a controlled substance analogue under § 802(32)(A). 
c. Applying a disjunctive reading of 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A) to 
the hypothetical 
Using the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s dis-
junctive reading of § 802(32)(A), a substance constitutes a controlled sub-
stance analogue if the substance satisfies § 802(32)(A)(i), § 802(32)(A)(ii), 
or § 802(32)(A)(iii).139 This type of reading would implicate methadone as a 
controlled substance analogue, but, under the same analysis, continue to 
hold naltrexone to the level of a controlled substance analogue. Therefore, a 
disjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A) would be more in-line with the purpose 
of the CSA, but it does not bring the purpose of the CSA into fruition.140 
IV. THE SOLUTION: AMEND THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT OF 1970 TO 
REMOVE THE CHEMICAL STRUCTURE REQUIREMENT OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE ANALOGUE 
Courts should not determine the meaning of the Analogue Act by ap-
plying minute grammatical theory, such as the doctrine of the last anteced-
ent.141 The meaning of the Analogue Act should be interpreted in such a way 
as to bring the purpose underlying the Analogue Act’s enactment into full 
 
 134. Keith Ahamad et al., Factors Associated with Willingness to Take Extended Release 
Naltrexone Among Injection Drug Users, 10 ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRACTICE 12, 13 
(2015). 
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 17554 (2012). 
 136. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. at 366–67. 
 137. Nora D. Volkow, Methadone - Appropriate Use Provides Valuable Treatment for 
Pain and Addiction, NAT’L INST. OF DRUG ABUSE (Aug. 2008), https://www.drugabuse.gov
/about-nida/directors-page/messages-director/2008/08/methadone-appropriate-use-provides-
valuable-treatment-pain-addiction. 
 138. Keith Ahamad et al., Factors Associated with Willingness to Take Extended Release 
Naltrexone Among Injection Drug Users, 10 ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL PRACTICE 12, 13 
(2015). 
 139. U.S. v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 521–523 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 140. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. at 366–67. 
 141. United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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fruition. By removing the chemical structure requirement of a controlled 
substance analogue and focusing on the behavioral effects of a substance on 
an individual’s central nervous system, the prosecutorial challenges142 noted 
by the DEA in the enforcement of the Analogue Act would be resolved.143 
A. Federal Government’s Solution: Synthetic Drug Control Act of 2015 
The ambiguity surrounding the language of § 802(32)(A) is no se-
cret.144 On September 17, 2015, the House of Representatives introduced 
proposed legislation called the Synthetic Drug Control Act of 2015 
(SDCA).145 Among other purposes, the SDCA’s stated purpose is “[t]o 
amend the CSA to clarify how controlled substance analogues are to be reg-
ulated.”146 
The SDCA is aimed at amending the CSA by striking “substantially” in 
each place where it appears in § 802(32)(A)(i), § 802(32)(A)(ii), and § 
802(32)(A)(iii).147 The SDCA also attempts to clarify the statutory interpre-
tation of § 802(32)(A), such as reading § 802(32)(A) disjunctively.148 
If this bill became law, it would represent a step in the right direction, 
but still leave the possibility of a substance being labeled a controlled sub-
stance analogue based solely on its chemical structure.149 As shown in the 
hypothetical above, the chemical structure of a drug does not determine the 
abuse potential of that substance. As previously demonstrated, the behavior-
al effects of a substance are what determine the abuse potential for that sub-
stance, not the chemical structure. 
B. Arkansas’s Solution: Act 329 of the Regular Session in the 89th Gen-
eral Assembly of the State of Arkansas 
Arkansas closely follows the scheduling criteria of the CSA for sched-
ules I-V, which Arkansas adopted into its criminal code as the Uniform 
 
 142. Lisa N. Sacco & Kristin Finklea, Synthetic Drugs: Overview and Issues for Con-
gress, Cong. Res. Serv. 16 n.79 (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42066
.pdf. 
 143. E-mail from Dr. William Fantegrossi, Professor, Dep’t Pharmacology & Toxicology 
at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, to author (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 CST) (on 
file with author). 
 144. Id. at 16. 
 145. Synthetic Drug Control Act of 2015, H.R. 3537, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 
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Controlled Substances Act (UCSA).150 Arkansas modified the scheduling 
criteria of the CSA by establishing a sixth schedule.151 Arkansas’s unique 
addition established a catchall schedule for all the substances that do not 
properly fit into other schedules.152 The Director of the Arkansas Depart-
ment of Health determines if a substance should be placed on schedule VI.153 
Arkansas was proactive in dealing with the emerging synthetic drug 
problem by simplifying the statutory language of Arkansas’s UCSA.154 On 
February 20, 2013, with the purposes of adding “synthetic substances, de-
rivatives, or their isomers” to Schedule VI of the UCSA and to focus more 
on the pharmacological effects of synthetic substances, derivatives, or their 
isomers, Arkansas House Bill 1415 was introduced.155 With no opposition, 
and only twenty days after being introduced, Arkansas House Bill 1415 be-
came Act 329 of the Regular Session of the 89th General Assembly of the 
State of Arkansas.156 
Prior to Arkansas House Bill 1415 being introduced, the portion of Ark 
Code. Ann. § 5-64-215 dealing with synthetic substance analogues stated 
that “[i]n addition to any substance placed in Schedule VI . . . any material, 
compound, mixture, or preparation, whether produced directly or indirectly 
from a substance of vegetable origin or independently . . . is included in 
Schedule VI,” if the substance is: 
A synthetic substance, derivative, or its isomer with: 
(A) Similar chemical structure to any substance described in 
subdivision (a)(1)-(4) of this section; or 
(B) Similar pharmacological activity to any substance de-
scribed in subdivisions (a)(1)-(4) of this section such as the 
following: 
(i) 1 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and its op-
tical isomers; 
(ii) 6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and its op-
tical isomers; and 
 
 150. Gerald F. Uelmen & Alex Kreit, The Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement 
Act of 1986, 1 DRUG ABUSE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 3:157 (Dec. 2015). 
 151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-214 (Repl. 2016). 
 152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-213 (Repl. 2016). 
 153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-214 (Repl. 2016). 
 154. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-215 (Rep. 2016). 
 155. H.B. 1415, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (digital version available at 
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Acts/Act329.pdf). 
 156. Arkansas State Legislature, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R
/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=HB1415 (last visited Mar. 16, 2016). 
344 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 




Arkansas House Bill 1415 simplified Ark Code. Ann. § 5-64-215 to 
read, “[i]n addition to any substance placed in Schedule VI . . . any material, 
compound, mixture, or preparation, whether produced directly or indirectly 
from a substance of vegetable origin or independently . . . is included in 
Schedule VI,” if the substance is: 
A synthetic substance, derivative, or its isomer with: 
(A) Similar chemical structure to any substance described in 
subdivision (a)(1)-(5) of this section; or 
(B) Similar pharmacological effects to any substance de-
scribed in subdivisions (a)(1)-(5) of this section.
158
 
Essentially, Arkansas House Bill 1415 simplified Ark. Code Ann. § 5-
64-215 by removing the pharmacological jargon and focusing on the “ef-
fects”159 of the substance instead of the “activity”160 of the substance. 
Arkansas’s simplification of its drug laws could be a model for the fed-
eral government and the rest of the states to follow. One benefit of Ark. 
Code Ann. § 5-64-215 is that a pharmacologist experienced in the structural 
and functional comparisons of different classes of drugs of abuse could 
make confident assertions regarding a questionable substance’s pharmaco-
logical similarity to previously controlled substances.161 Dr. Fantegrossi has 
emphasized the importance of looking at the pharmacological “effect” of a 
substance when determining the addictive potential of that substance.162 On 
the other hand, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-215 still places emphasis on a drug’s 
chemical structure; therefore, the text of the statute does not entirely track 
the purpose of the CSA.163 
 
 157. H.B. 1415, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
 158. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-215(a) (Repl. 2016). 
 159. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-215(a)(6)(B) (Repl. 2016). 
 160. H.B. 1415, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
 161. Fantegrossi Aff. 6 (Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with author). 
 162. Id. at 3. 
 163. United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364, 366–67 (W.D. Pa. 1971). 
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C. Author’s Solution: Create a Statute with Language that Accurately Re-
flects the Stated Purpose of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970 
The purpose of the CSA is not a mystery, and courts have accurately 
noted the purpose of the CSA before straying from it.164 The Analogue Act 
was created to “close[ ] the loophole in [the CSA] that allows the creation 
and distribution of deadly new drugs without violating [f]ederal law.”165 As 
the DEA has recently noted, law enforcement still face prosecutorial chal-
lenges when applying the Analogue Act due to subjectivity surrounding the 
language “substantially similar.”166 Therefore, the loophole the Analogue 
Act tried to eradicate continues to present a problem for law enforcement.167 
If preventing the abuse of drugs remains the stated purpose of the 
CSA,168 courts should read the statutory language of the CSA to be in ac-
cordance with its stated purpose.169 Courts have recognized the difficulty in 
dealing with the question of whether a substance has a similar chemical 
structure to that of a controlled substance.170 
Although a substance’s chemical structure can be important to under-
standing the substance’s pharmacological activity,171 more emphasis should 
be placed on the substance’s in vivo pharmacological profile,172 such as the 
substance’s pharmacological effects. It is true that the chemical structure of 
a drug controls that drug’s affinity for its receptor and its ability to elicit a 
behavioral response, but it is ultimately the biochemical and physiological 
changes after the drug has come into contact with its receptor that character-
 
 164. United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 432 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The object of the Ana-
logue Act is to prevent underground chemists from producing slightly modified drugs that are 
legal but have the same effects and dangers as scheduled controlled substances.”); United 
States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 238 (D. Col. 1992) (“Congress declared that the purpose 
of the statute is to attack underground chemists who tinker with the molecules of controlled 
substances to create new drugs that are not yet illegal.”); Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. at 366 
(“The purpose of the enactment of the 1970 Act was to provide a system for the control of 
drug traffic and to prevent the abuse of drugs.”). 
 165. Hodge, 321 F.3d at 437 (quoting Senator Al D’Amato’s statement in 131 Cong. Rec. 
27311 (1985)). 
 166. Lisa N. Sacco & Kristin Finklea, Synthetic Drugs: Overview and Issues for Con-
gress, Cong. Res. Serv. 16 n.79 (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42066
.pdf. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 366. 
 169. Hodge, 321 F.3d at 436-37. 
 170. United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 527 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the difficulty in 
dealing with questions of similarities of chemical structure, and stating “even if such chemi-
cal similarities exist, and even if the defendant is aware of these similarities, the intricacies of 
chemical science may render it extremely difficult to prove that a defendant had such 
knowledge.”). 
 171. Fantegrossi Aff. 10 (Sept. 8, 2015) (on file with author). 
 172. Id. at 12. 
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ize the drug’s response.173 According to NIDA, individuals take drugs for a 
variety of reasons, including: (1) to feel good; (2) to feel better; (3) to do 
better; and (4) for curiosity.174 Individuals do not start taking drugs for the 
drug’s chemical structure; individuals take drugs because the individuals 
perceive what appear to be positive behavioral effects.175 These effects are 
what the CSA was made to fight against, not the drug’s chemical struc-
ture.176 
The CSA should be amended to remove the requirement that a con-
trolled substance analogue be a substance with a chemical structure that is 
“substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in 
schedule I or II.”177 This could be done by simplifying the portion of the 
CSA178 dealing with controlled substance analogues, to read: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term “controlled substance 
analogue” means a substance – 
(i) that has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on 
the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or 
greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in 
schedule I or II; or 
(ii) with respect to a particular person, which such person rep-
resents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or halluci-
nogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substan-
tially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a con-
trolled substance in schedule I or II. 
By adopting the author’s proposed amendment to the text of § 
802(32)(A), the intent of the CSA would be brought into fruition. This can 
be demonstrated by revisiting the hypothetical from earlier.179 Under the 
proposed CSA amendment, naltrexone would not be classified as a con-
trolled substance analogue. Naltrexone, although chemically similar to hero-
in, would not be a controlled substance analogue due to it not having an 
“effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or great-
 
 173. Philip T. Reeves, Drug Action and Pharmacodynamics (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.merckvetmanual.com/mvm/pharmacology/pharmacology_introduction/drug_acti
on_and_pharmacodynamics.html. 
 174. NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF 
ADDICTION 6 (2014), https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/soa_2014.pdf. 
 175. Id. at 7. 
 176. See United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1971). 
 177. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A)(i) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 178. 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A) (2012 & Supp. I. 2017). 
 179. See supra Part III.C.1.a–c. 
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er than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.” While metha-
done, despite not chemically similar to heroin, would be a controlled sub-
stance analogue due to it having an “effect on the central nervous system 
that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled sub-
stance in schedule I or II,” which in this case would be heroin. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the CSA is to ban the behavioral effects of drugs that 
have a potential for abuse. Yet the ambiguity surrounding the language of § 
802(32)(A) has led courts to stray far from the stated purpose of the CSA 
and to dwell on minute grammatical theory. By obsessing over the meaning 
of coordinating conjunctions, and in this case the absences of a coordinating 
conjunction, courts have lost focus of the stated purpose of the CSA. Be-
cause the stated purpose of the CSA is to prevent the abuse of drugs, the 
intent of the CSA would be brought to fruition if a substance’s behavioral 
effects on an individual’s central nervous system were emphasized when 
determining if a synthetic drug is a controlled substance analogue. 
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